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Abstract This paper presents novel data regarding the logophoric pronoun in
Ewe. We show that, contrary to what had been assumed in the absence of the
necessary fieldwork, Ewe logophors are not obligatorily interpreted de se. We
discuss the prima facie rather surprising nature of this discovery given the as-
sumptions that de se construals arise via binding of the pronoun by an abstraction
operator in the left periphery of the clausal complement of an attitude predicate, and
that logophors are elements that are obligatorily bound by such abstractors. We
show that this approach can be reconciled with these facts given the additional
assumption that elements that are ‘de se’ bound can interact with the concept
generator variables posited by Percus and Sauerland (Proceedings of Sinn und
Bedeutung 7, 2003a; Proceedings of NELS 33, 2003b) to derive de re interpretations
of embedded nominals. The proposed set-up has consequences for our under-
standing of puzzles raised by Heim and Sharvit concerning binding-theoretic effects
with de re elements, and for the derivation of the obligatorily de se interpretation of
controlled PRO.
Keywords Attitudes de se · Attitudes de re · Logophoric pronouns ·
Crosslinguistic semantics · Obligatory control · Ewe
1 Introduction
The topic of this paper is the logophoric pronoun in the West African language Ewe.
Logophoric pronouns are traditionally defined as elements that (i) obligatorily occur
in the scope of an attitude predicate such as believe or say and (ii) are obligatorily
construed as referring to the bearer of the attitude, such as the subject of believe or
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say. The logophoric pronoun in Ewe is yè; the language also has a ‘plain pronoun’ e
which is like the English third person pronoun in that its distribution is not confined
to attitude reports. The examples below show that properties (i) and (ii) hold of yè
but not of e.1
(1) Kofi be yè dzo.
Kofi say LOG leave
‘Kofii said that hei/*j left.’
(2) *Yè dzo.
LOG leave
(3) Kofi be e dzo.
Kofi say 3SG leave




In some respects logophoric pronouns like yè resemble obligatorily controlled PRO:
they can only occur in an embedded clause, and when they do they obligatorily refer
to some designated argument of the embedding verb.2 Consequently, it is tempting
to think of logophors as overt instantiations of PRO. One might then suppose that
they have interpretive as well as distributional properties in common. This paper
investigates whether this expectation is borne out with respect to the property of
being interpreted ‘de se’.
It has been known since Morgan (1970) that when obligatorily controlled PRO
occurs in an attitude report, it must be interpreted de se. That is, the content
expressed by the infinitive or gerund in which it occurs is necessarily first personal
with respect to the attitude holder. Take the following sentence:
(5) John claimed [PRO to be clever].
Sentence (5) reports a claim that John made about himself, namely that he is clever.
Typically, when we talk about ourselves, we do so using the first person pronoun: a
natural scenario that renders (5) true is one in which John said, “I am clever”. But
1 This generalization will be refined in Sect. 3.2, where we present evidence that the distribution of yè is
slightly broader for some speakers of Ewe.
2 Unlike PRO, however, in the case of yè the embedding verb must be an attitude predicate; the class of




notice that this is not the only way that we can talk about ourselves. Consider the
following scenario.
(6) Scenario: John has just found an old paper that he wrote, but because his
memory is failing him he fails to recognize the paper as one of his own.
He reads the paper and, impressed by the content, says, “Whoever wrote
this paper is clever.”
In this scenario, John says something about a certain individual, namely the author
of the paper. What you and I know, but he does not, is that the author of the paper is
none other than John himself; consequently, the content of his speech act is ‘about’
John in some intuitive sense. Is this sufficient to render the control sentence in (5)
true in this scenario? No. For it to be true, the content of John’s utterance would not
only have to concern himself, but it would have to be first personal with respect to
John. That is, John would have to have said “I am clever”—a statement that would
require him to be in possession of the crucial information that we have but John
lacks, namely that he is the author of the paper.
Had John said “I am clever”, then his speech act would have been an instance of
a particular type of attitude called an attitude de se. An agent α bears an attitude de
se towards a content ϕ only if (i) ϕ is ‘about’ α and (ii) α figures in ϕ in virtue of α
thinking of herself in a first personal way. In the case of a speech report, this just
means that α uses the first person pronoun to express ϕ. In the case of a belief report,
it means that α is in a position to use the first person pronoun to report her belief that
ϕ. In (6), John’s speech act is not an instance of an attitude de se, since he is
unaware that he is talking about himself, and therefore the constituent of his
utterance that refers to him is a definite description rather than the first person
pronoun. Sentence (5) is false in scenario (6) for precisely this reason. This shows
that control sentences such as (5) obligatorily report attitudes de se. We shall
describe a pronoun as being obligatorily construed de se just in case it
unambiguously produces a report of an attitude de se when it is embedded below
an attitude predicate. PRO is such a pronoun.
A natural question to ask is whether there are overt pronouns that are obligatorily
construed de se. Take the English third person pronoun. It can be interpreted de se,
but need not be:
(7) Johni claimed that hei was clever.
We ask the same question concerning (7) as we did about (5): can it truthfully be
used to report the scenario in (6)? This time, the answer is ‘yes’. So unlike PRO, he
need not be interpreted de se. It can be, however, as shown by (8):
(8) Johni didn’t claim that hei was clever, because hei didn’t realize that hei was
talking about himself.
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In (8), the fact that John did not think of or refer to himself in a first personal way
is offered as grounds for the falsehood of (7). So he can be interpreted de se, as in
(8), or it can be interpreted de re, as when (7) is judged true in the scenario in (6).
Now let us return to the case of logophoric pronouns. If a logophor like yè is an
overt counterpart of PRO, then it is expected that it too is obligatorily read de se. To
date, there has been no semantic fieldwork on Ewe to check whether this conjecture
is correct. However, there is some preliminary evidence that logophoric pronouns
are obligatorily interpreted de se in the languages Bafut (Kusumoto 1998), Yoruba
(Anand 2006), and Tangale (Haida 2009).3 Despite this still rather incomplete
picture of the empirical landscape, expressions of confidence that logophors are
obligatorily interpreted de se in Ewe and in other languages are pervasive in the
literature on attitude reports (Heim 2001, 2002; Schlenker 1999; Stephenson 2007b,
2010; von Stechow 2002, 2003). Section 3 of this paper provides data elicited from
five native Ewe speakers that suggest that the conjecture is in fact incorrect—at least
so far as Ewe is concerned. We show that despite the distributional similarities
between yè and PRO, yè displays ambiguity between a de se and a de re reading. For
example, the following sentence is judged true in the scenario we have been
considering.
(9) John be yè le cleva.
John say LOG COP clever
‘John said that he was clever.’
The idea that a pronoun that obligatorily occurs in the scope of an attitude predicate
and denotes the attitude holder is a de se expression has its roots in a philosophical
tradition that precedes both linguistic work on the semantics of de se attitude reports
and the seminal work of Clements (1975) on logophoric pronouns in Ewe.
Castañeda famously postulated a pronoun he* which could occur in a configuration
such as the following.
(10) The Editor of Soul knows that he* is a millionaire.
(Castañeda 1968, p. 440, ex. 3)
Sentence (10) is taken to report an attribution of self-knowledge to the Editor of
Soul, with Castañeda stipulating that “he* is used to attribute, so to speak, implicit
indexical references to the Editor of Soul; that is, if the Editor were to assert what,
according to… [(10)]… he knows, he would use the indicator I, where we,
uttering… [(10)] … have used he*” (Castañeda 1968, p. 441). Of course, if the
3 Descriptions of logophoric elements that do not explicitly address the question of de se interpretation
include Clements (1975) and Orita (2009) on Ewe; Clements (1975) and Hagège (1974) on Mundung;
Frajzyngier (1985) on Mupun; Hyman and Comrie (1981) on Gokana; Thomas (1978) on Engenni;
Hyman (1979) on Aghem; Voorhoeve (1980) on Ngwo; and Deal and O’Connor (2010) on Northern
Pomo. In Sect. 7.2 we place our Ewe data in the broader context of what is known about logophoric
pronouns in other languages.
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Editor is in a position to say, “I am a millionaire,” then his knowledge that he is a
millionaire is an attitude de se.
The unearthing of logophoric pronouns was taken as evidence that Castañeda’s
he* exists after all (Schlenker 1999, 2003). Aside from the resemblance of these
pronouns to PRO, the temptation to assume that they are de se elements was perhaps
made more acute by the fact that Castañeda invoked he* as a means not only of
indicating that the pronoun takes the attitude holder as its antecedent, but also of
indicating that the reported attitude is about the self, accessed from a first personal
point of view. But notice that there is no a priori reason to think that these two
properties are necessarily correlated. In principle, there could be a pronoun that
picks out the bearer of the attitude reported by the sentence in which it occurs, but
which need not require that the attitude holder thinks of herself in a first personal
way. We will show that the logophoric pronoun in Ewe is such a pronoun, and
present an account that reconciles the distribution of yè with its ability to be read
de re.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents some theoretical background
concerning reports of attitudes de se and de re. Section 3 lays out our data
concerning the distribution of yè, and Sect. 4 presents our findings about how yè is
interpreted. In Sect. 5 we develop an account that reconciles the distribution of yè
with its ability to be construed de re, and then in Sect. 6 we address a possible
objection to our approach. Consequences of the proposal for theories concerning
obligatorily controlled PRO and for our understanding of logophoricity are
discussed in Sect. 7. This section also shows that our approach provides a solution
to a long-standing puzzle concerning binding-theoretic effects with de re reflexives
discussed by Heim (1994) and Sharvit (2011). Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical background
This section presents background on the semantics of attitude reports. Section 2.1
describes a widely accepted treatment of reports of attitudes de se, namely that of
Chierchia (1990), with particular attention to the interpretation of obligatorily
controlled PRO. Given the observations in the Introduction concerning the
distributional similarities between PRO and logophoric pronouns, this provides an
opportunity to present an application of Chierchia’s analysis of control to attitude
reports with logophoric pronouns (Heim 2002; von Stechow 2002, 2003). This then
enables us to describe more precisely the theoretical basis for the conjecture that
logophoric pronouns are unambiguously de se elements. In Sect. 2.2, we turn our
attention to de re construals of DPs in the scope of attitude predicates, and describe
the view of such construals developed by David Kaplan and David Lewis.
Section 2.3 is devoted to a discussion of a particular implementation of this view,
due to Percus and Sauerland (2003a). Section 2.4 discusses the overall picture of the
syntax and semantics of attitude reports that emerges from these proposals, and
identifies consequences for the analysis of yè.
The interpretation of the logophoric pronoun in Ewe 81
123
2.1 The analysis of de se pronouns: the case of PRO
How do de se construals arise? Following Chierchia (1990), one prominent
approach is to posit an individual abstractor in the left periphery of the embedded
clause, which binds the pronoun.4 Consider (5) again, repeated here as (11), which
we have seen is interpreted de se:
(11) John claimed [PRO to be clever].
Following Lewis (1979), Chierchia proposed that the sentence reports John’s self-
ascription, in the form of a speech act, of the property of being clever. This is
implemented via an individual abstractor in the left edge of the control complement:
(12) [CP1 λw1 [w1 John claimed [CP2 λx2λw3 [w3 PRO2 to be clever]]]]
We assume that Logical Forms incorporate abstraction operators that bind
coindexed variables of the appropriate type in their scope. Root clauses always
bear an abstractor over worlds in their left periphery, so that sentence meanings are
functions from worlds to truth values.5 The crucial aspect of Chierchia’s analysis
that (12) illustrates is that PRO is bound by a local individual abstractor. To show
that this predicts that PRO is construed de se, we display below the lexical entry of
claim, followed by the interpretation that the semantic rules assign to the LF in (12),
working bottom up from the embedded clause.
(13) ⟦claim⟧c,g = λP\e,\s,t[[λxeλws. 8\w’, y[ 2 claimx,w, P(y)(w’)
where claimx,w = {\w’, y[: what x claims in w is true in w’ and x
identifies herself as y in w’}
(14) a. ⟦CP2⟧c,g = λxλw. x is clever in w
b. ⟦CP1⟧c,g = λw. 8\w’, y[ 2 claimJohn,w, y is clever in w’
Notice that the semantics for attitude predicates assumed here characterizes the
content of a mental attitude or speech act not as a set of worlds, as on a traditional
Hintikka semantics for attitude reports (Hintikka 1969), but as a set of world-
individual pairs. The verb claim, for instance, is a quantifier over elements of the set
of claim-alternatives \w’, y[ such that it is compatible with what the attitude
holder (the subject) says for her to be y in w’. This conception of an attitude
predicate as a quantifier over elements that are more fine-grained than worlds
ensures that a property expressed by the verb’s clausal complement is of suitable
4 An alternative is to treat control predicates as quantifiers over evaluation indices, posit an individual
coordinate of the evaluation index in addition to the world coordinate, and stipulate that PRO has this
coordinate as its semantic value. For context-shifting approaches such as that of Anand and Nevins
(2004), the individual coordinate is the author of a shifted context; for Stephenson (2007b, 2010), it is the
‘judge’ parameter associated with the interpretation of predicates of personal taste and epistemic modals.




type to serve as its first argument, thereby making it possible to implement the
Lewis-Chierchia view that an agent α bears an attitude de se towards a content ϕ just
in case ϕ is a property self-ascribed by α. According to (14), (12) reports that John
ascribes the property of being clever to the individual y that he designates as himself
at each of the worlds w’ compatible with the content of his speech act. Since it is
stipulated in the definition of claim-alternatives in (13) that such an individual y is a
candidate of the attitude holder’s for himself, y must necessarily be an individual
that the attitude holder would be prepared to refer to in a first personal way.
Consequently, in a scenario where John attributes cleverness to the individual
satisfying the description ‘the author of this paper’, failing to realize that in doing so
he attributes cleverness to himself, (12) is correctly predicted to be false.
We have just seen that a theory where PRO is obligatorily abstracted over by an
operator in embedded C correctly predicts that when the control predicate is
attitudinal, PRO is necessarily interpreted de se.6 A further virtue of this proposal is
that it also predicts that in such a configuration, PRO is interpreted in the unmarked
case as picking out the attitude holder.7 That this is correct is exemplified by (15).
(15) Johni claimed to Maryj [PROi/*j to be cleverer than herj/*himi]
With a speech act verb such as claim, the attitude holder is the agent of the speech
act—John, in (15), not Mary. To see how the inability of Mary to serve as the
controller of PRO follows from the semantics in (14), consider that (14) says that for
all of John’s claim-alternatives \w’, y[, y is clever in w’. If John is in his right
mind, such a y is just John himself (or John’s counterpart in w’). Consequently, it is
John, and not Mary, who is ascribed cleverness. This captures our intuitions about
which individual serves as the antecedent of PRO, without having to postulate a
syntactic module dedicated to identification of the controller.
Heim (2002) and von Stechow (2002, 2003) noticed that this technology makes
available a straightforward account of the distribution of logophoric pronouns such
as yè. Recall that logophors (i) obligatorily occur in the scope of an attitude
predicate and (ii) necessarily pick out the attitude holder. Heim (2002) and von
Stechow (2002, 2003) follow Chierchia in assuming that an attitude verb introduces
an individual abstractor in the left periphery of the clause it embeds. Any pronoun
that is bound by this operator, such as PRO, is expected to be obligatorily construed
de se. They propose that logophoric pronouns and PRO are both required to be
bound by the abstractor. This is rendered by appealing to an uninterpretable feature
[log] on the logophor and on PRO, which must be checked under binding by an
6 Notice that this is compatible with there being non-attitudinal control predicates such as force, which
quantifies over worlds rather than over world-individual pairs. Such verbs can also be given a semantics
whereby they take an argument of property type. This is an advantage of Chierchia’s approach over
accounts such as Anand and Nevins (2004) or Stephenson (2007b, 2010) that treat PRO as picking out the
‘author’ or ‘judge’ coordinate of the world-individual pairs quantified over by the control predicate (see
footnote 4).
7 In a case where the attitude holder puts herself in the shoes of someone else, PRO picks out that
individual, as in John imagined being Napoleon. This too is predicted by Chierchia’s theory; the
individual coordinates of John’s imagine-alternatives are Napoleon rather than John.
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operator bearing the same feature. An attitude predicate passes [log] to the
individual abstractor that it introduces in embedded C, thereby enabling this feature
to be checked on PRO or the logophor. This is illustrated for PRO and yè in (16).
(16) a. [CP1λw1 [w1 John claimed[log] [CP2λx2[log]λw3 [w3 PRO2[log] to be
clever]]]]
b. [CP1λw1 [w1 John claimed[log] [CP2λx2[log]λw3 [w3 yè2[log] was clever]]]]
This idea provides an elegant treatment of the distribution of logophors, and
arguably captures the parallel between these elements and PRO.8 It is correctly
predicted that yè must occur in the scope of an attitude verb: the feature [log]
requires yè to be bound by (the abstractor introduced by) an attitude predicate.
Furthermore, since yè, like PRO, is abstracted over, the clause in which it occurs is
interpreted as expressing a property whose individual argument is a variable over
‘epistemic alternatives’ of the attitude holder—the attitude holder’s candidates for
herself. This correctly predicts that yè takes an attitude holder as its antecedent; the
argumentation is analogous to that which we have already seen with PRO.
Finally, the Heim–von Stechow view predicts that yè is obligatorily construed de
se. For example, since the embedded clause in (16b) expresses the same property as
the control complement in (16a), the two sentences have identical truth conditions.
Given the elegant manner in which the Heim–von Stechow view captures the
distribution of logophors, it was not unreasonable to suppose that this prediction
would be borne out. It is all the more surprising, then, to discover that yè can in fact
be construed de re. Before we turn to the data that demonstrate this, we shall
introduce some theoretical background concerning de re construals. Since the goal
of this paper is to reconcile the availability of the de re construal of yè with its
distribution, this technology will play an important role in our analysis.
2.2 Background on de re belief
This section presents the traditional view on the truth conditions of de re belief
reports (Kaplan 1968; Lewis 1979). A compositional semantics is given in Sect. 2.3.
Consider (17).
(17) Johni believed that hei was clever.
Suppose again that John has said, “The author of this paper is clever,” unaware that
in doing so he ascribes cleverness to himself. Suppose also that his utterance is a
sincere expression of one of his beliefs. There is a reading of (17) upon which it is
true in this scenario; this is the analogue of our observation concerning overt
pronouns embedded in the scope of claim, presented in the Introduction. On this
8 However, if attitude verbs are the only operators that bear [log], it may be undesirable to posit this
feature for PRO, given that not all control predicates are attitudinal (see footnote 2). In this paper, we
pursue the idea that yè bears [log], but set aside the question of how the requirement that PRO be
abstracted over is implemented. Further applications of the [log] feature are found in Anand (2006) and
von Stechow (2002, 2003).
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reading, he is construed de re. The goal of this section is to state the truth conditions
of reports of beliefs de re such as (17).
In the relevant scenario, John believes that the author of the paper that he read is
clever. Furthermore, John’s belief is about himself in virtue of the fact that John is
the author of the paper that he read. These circumstances are responsible for the
truth of (17). We can model this by identifying the concept associated with the
expression the author of the paper that John read. This is just that function f that
maps a world w to the individual that wrote the paper that John read in w. In the
scenario under consideration, f has two properties that make it what we shall call a
suitable concept for the attitude holder John. Firstly, it is reliable in that when
applied to the actual world it returns the res itself—John in this case. (When applied
to other worlds, it may return other individuals, however. This will be the case when
it is applied to John’s belief worlds, since John does not believe (de se) that he is the
author of the paper.) Secondly, it is acquaintance-based in that the individual that it
returns in a world w is the unique individual to whom John bears the acquaintance
relation ‘read the paper of’ in w. On its de re reading, (17) involves existential
quantification over concepts that are suitable for the attitude holder John with
respect to the res John, where suitability is defined as in (18).9
(18) Suitable concept (first version)
An individual concept f is suitable for an attitude holder x in w with respect
to a res u iff
(i) f(w) = u; Reliability
(ii) there is an acquaintance relation R such that for all worlds w’ in the
domain of f, x bears R uniquely to f(w’) in w’. Acquaintance-based
The truth conditions of (17) can then be defined as follows.
(19) Truth conditions of (17) (first version)
⟦(17)⟧c,g = 1 in w (on its de re reading) iff there is some concept f that is
suitable for John in w with respect to John such that for all worlds w’
compatible with what John believes in w, f(w’) is clever in w’.
A problem with (18) and (19) is that they require a treatment of doxastic alternatives
(objects compatible with what the attitude holder believes) as worlds. Yet in Sect.
2.1 we pursued the idea that the elements quantified over by attitude verbs—claim-
alternatives, doxastic alternatives, and so on—are world-individual pairs rather than
worlds. This can be addressed by pursuing Lewis’s insight that the incorporation of
acquaintance relations into the semantics introduces a de se component (Lewis
9 Intuitively, the ‘res’ is simply the individual which a de re attitude is about. Because we are concerned
with the de re/de se distinction, we focus on examples where the attitude holder and the res are the same
individual. This need not be the case, however, as when Ralph believes de re of Ortcutt that he is a spy
(Quine 1956).
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1979). The belief of John’s that we are interested in in (17) can be expressed by him
as, “The author of the paper that I read is clever.” So for any world w’ compatible
with what John believes, the concept should pick out the author of the paper that y
read in w’, where y is John’s doxastic center in w’. We have:
(20) Suitable concept (final version)10
An individual concept f is suitable for an attitude holder x in w with
respect to a res u iff
(i) f(w, x) = u; Reliability
(ii) there is an acquaintance relation R such that for all world-individual
pairs \w’, y[ in the domain of f, y bears R uniquely to
f(w’, y) in w’. Acquaintance-based
Notice that acquaintance-based concepts are now functions from world-individual
pairs to individuals, rather than from worlds to individuals as before. Here then are
the final truth conditions for (17):
(21) Truth conditions of (17) (final version)
⟦(17)⟧c,g = 1 in w (on its de re reading) iff there is some concept f that is
suitable for John in w with respect to John such that for all \w’, y[
2 DoxJohn,w, f(w’, y) is clever in w’;
where Doxx,w = {\w’, y[: what x believes in w is true in w’ and x
identifies herself as y in w’}
Let us now generalize this to provide truth conditions for reports of beliefs
de re:11
(22) Truth conditions for reports of beliefs de re
For any attitude holder x, res u and one-place predicate P, ‘x believes that u is
P’ is true in w iff there is some concept f that is suitable for x in w with
respect to u such that for all \w’, y[ 2 Doxx,w, f(w’, y) is P in w’.
We can then provide the following lexical entry for the de re variant of believe:12
(23) De re variant of ‘believe’ (first version)
⟦believede re⟧c,g = λxeλP\e,\s,t[[λyeλws. ∃f: f is suitable for y in w with
respect to x & 8\w’, z[ 2 Doxx,w, P(f(w’, z))(w’)
10 A further proviso, which we ignore throughout this paper, is that the acquaintance relation that the
attitude holder bears to the res should be sufficiently ‘vivid’ in the sense of Kaplan (1968).
11 Although we focus on de re beliefs in this subsection, the semantics in (22) can be generalized to other
types of attitude by replacing doxastic alternatives with the appropriate type of attitudinal alternative.
12 This version will be slightly amended in the next subsection.
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Notice that we have treated de re belief as a three-place relation between an
attitude holder, a res, and a property. But in terms of surface syntax, the verb believe
merely takes a clausal complement, yielding a VP that combines with the subject
(the attitude holder). The complement clause contains both the linguistic material
that contributes the res (a DP) and that which contributes the property that the belief
holder ascribes to the res (a VP). This gives rise to a well-known compositionality
puzzle: how can a Logical Form be generated that ensures that the res is fed to
believe as one of its arguments? One approach is to posit covert movement of the
DP that denotes the res. This is shown schematically in (24):
(24) [x believes [res u] [λx1 t1 VP]]
There are well-known difficulties with the covert res movement approach (see
Anand 2006 and Charlow and Sharvit 2014 for discussion), and we instead adopt a
proposal that lets the res remain in situ (Percus and Sauerland 2003a). This proposal
is presented in the next subsection.
2.3 The concept generator approach to attitudes de re
We will employ a theory of de re attitude ascription based on the notion of a
‘concept generator’ introduced by Percus and Sauerland (2003a) and discussed
further in Anand (2006) and Charlow and Sharvit (2014). This is a function that
takes a res as its argument, and returns a concept with the appropriate properties for
it to figure in the calculation of the truth conditions of a de re attitude report—one
that is acquaintance-based for the attitude holder, returns the res itself when applied
to the pair consisting of the actual world and the attitude holder, and so on. Concept
generators are introduced into the LF by embedding of the DP denoting the res in a
larger covert constituent (a ‘resP’) that contains a variable over concept generators.
This variable is abstracted over, as shown schematically below:
(25) John believed [λG1 [ [resP G1 he] was clever]].
Recall that we have said that belief de re has a de se component in the sense that the
attitude holder’s beliefs concerning the way(s) in which she is acquainted with the
res are beliefs de se: when John believes that the person whose paper he read is
clever, he self-ascribes the property of bearing the acquaintance relation ‘read the
paper of’ uniquely to some individual who is clever. This is modeled as in Sect. 2.1,
with abstractors over individual and world variables in embedded C. This time, the
de se pronoun that is bound by the individual abstractor is not controlled PRO, but
rather a covert pronoun within the resP. This pronoun and a bound world variable
pronoun serve as the arguments of the concept that is returned when the concept
generator variable is fed the res as its argument. Recall from the last subsection that
the kinds of concepts that we are interested in are functions from world-individual
pairs to individuals. The inclusion of covert individual and world pronouns in the
resP ensures that this constituent contributes an individual—the individual
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associated with the concept at each of the world-individual pairs quantified over by
the attitude predicate. The complete LF is provided in (26):
(26) [λw1 [w1 John5 believed [λG2λx3λw4 [w4 [resP G2 he5 w4 x3] was clever]]]].
Notice that leaving the res in situ lets us analyze believe as a two-place predicate—a
relation between individuals and functions from concept generators to properties.
Concept generators are functions from individuals to concepts, type \e,\s,
\e,e[[[. The complement of de re believe is therefore of type \\e,\s,
\e,e[[[, \e, \s,t[[[. Additionally, believe is no longer treated as an
existential quantifier over concepts that are suitable for the attitude holder with respect
to the res as in Sect. 2.2, but as an existential quantifier over concept generators that
are suitable for the attitude holder, where a concept generator G is suitable for x just in
case for every individual u in the domain of G, G(u) is a suitable concept for x with
respect to u. Here is the final version of the lexical entry for believede re, along with the
definition of suitability of a concept generator for an attitude holder.13,14
(27) De re variant of ‘believe’ (final version)
⟦believede re⟧c, g = λΠ\\e,\s,\e,e[[[,\e,\s,t[[[λxeλws. ∃G: G is suitable
for x in w & 8\w’, z[ 2 Doxx,w, Π(G)(y)(w’)
(28) Suitable concept generator (first version)
A concept generator G is suitable for x in w iff for all u in the domain of G:
(i) G(u)(w, x) = u; Reliability
(ii) there is an acquaintance relation R such that for all world-individual
pairs \w’, y[ in the domain of G(u), y bears R uniquely to
G(u)(w’, y) in w’. Acquaintance-based
13 This is the standard definition of suitability for concept generators; an amendment is proposed in
Sect. 2.4.
14 Definition (28) treats concept generators as functions from individuals to functions from world-
individual pairs to individuals, rather than from individuals to worlds to individuals to individuals as in
(27). Since the latter is merely a Schönfinkelized version of the former, this does not present any
problems. The advantage of thinking in terms of world-individual pairs when defining suitability is that it
lets us conceive of the domain of a function G(u) as a set of world-individual pairs. We assume the
following:
(i) If G is a suitable concept generator for x in w, then for any u in the domain of G, the domain of
G(u) = \w, x[ ∪ ATTx,w;
where ATTx,w = {\w’, y[: it is compatible with x’s mental state or speech act for w’ to be w and x
identifies herself as y in w’}
The notion of attitudinal alternatives ATTx,w is just a generalization of the particular types of alternatives
quantified over by attitude verbs (claim-alternatives, doxastic alternatives, etc.). (i) may be too strong:
alternatives associated with counterfactual attitudes like imagine should possibly be excluded from the
domain of the concept, since under counterfactual attitudes de re DPs seem to be interpreted with respect




To show that this LF and semantics yield the truth conditions of a de re belief report
without appeal to res movement, we present computations for Johni believed hei was
clever:
(29) a. [CP1λw1 [ w1 John5 believed [CP2λG2λx3λw4 [w4 [resP G2 he5 w4 x3] was
clever]]]].
b. ⟦CP2⟧c,g = λGλxλw. G(John)(w)(x) was clever in w
c. ⟦CP1⟧c,g = λw. ∃G: G is suitable for John in w & 8\w’, y[ 2 DoxJohn,w,
⟦CP2⟧c,g(G)(w’)(y) = λw. ∃G: G is suitable for John in w & 8\w’, y[2
DoxJohn,w, G(John)(w’)(y) is clever in w’.
The sentence is true just in case there is some suitable concept generator for John in
w such that at each of John’s doxastic alternatives \w’, y[, the individual that the
concept generator maps John to at \w’, y[ is clever in w’. The existential
quantification is witnessed by a concept generator that maps John to a concept f such
that (i) f(w, John) = John and (ii) for every \w’, y[ in the domain of f, f(w’, y) is
the unique individual whose paper y read in w’. Consequently, Johni believed hei
was clever is predicted to be true in the relevant scenario.
The concept generator approach has the virtue of permitting the res to be
interpreted in situ, although this comes at the cost of positing additional covert
material. A consideration of the advantages of this approach over one based on res
movement is beyond the scope of this paper; empirical arguments are provided in
Charlow and Sharvit (2014). In the next subsection, we consider some consequences
of the approaches to de se and de re construal discussed here, in relation to
predictions concerning logophoric pronouns.
2.4 Consequences for the LFs of attitude reports
Charlow and Sharvit (2014, fn. 24) notice the following problem. Suppose we
consider a pronoun pro that occurs in the complement clause of an attitude
predicate. In such a configuration, a pronoun may be bound by an individual
abstractor, as in (30), or it may be embedded in a resP, as in (31).
(30) [α … Vatt … [λxi … [ … proi …]]]
(31) [α … Vatt … [λGj … [ … [resP Gj pro …] …]]]
In principle, it seems that there is nothing to prevent the syntax from generating a
‘hybrid’ of these two structures, where pro is both abstracted over and embedded in
a resP:
(32) [α … Vatt … [λGj λxi … [ … [resP Gj proi …] …]]]
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This should amount to embedding of a de se pronoun in a larger constituent that is
construed de re. Charlow and Sharvit show that this generates unattested truth
conditions for a sentence such as (33a), where the LF under consideration is (33b).
(33) a. Suei believes shei is a bore.
b. [CP1λw1 [ w1 Sue believes [CP2λG2λx3λw4 [w4 [resP G2 she3 w4 x3] is a
bore]]]].
They consider the following situation. Sue believes that she is Mary; thus at each of
Sue’s doxastic alternatives \w’, y[, y = Mary. (33b) is then predicted to be true
in this situation just in case there is a concept generator G that is suitable for Sue
such that at each of Sue’s doxastic alternatives\w’, y[, G(Mary)(w’)(y’) is a bore
in w’. Suppose in addition that Sue has met the woman who lives at 17 Quincy St.
and formed the belief that she is a bore, but that unbeknown to her, that woman is in
fact Mary. Then there is a suitable concept generator that witnesses the existential
quantifier—namely, one that maps Mary to the concept associated with the
description, ‘the woman who lives at 17 Quincy’. Thus there should be a reading of
(33a) on which it is true, even if Sue believes de se that she is not a bore. But there is
no such reading.
Matters are no better if one adopts a theory of world-bound individuals,
according to which no individual inhabits more than one world.15 From such a
theory it follows that if a pronoun is interpreted as a variable over epistemic
alternatives of the attitude holder, then its semantic value ranges over individuals
that inhabit not the actual world, but rather the attitude holder’s belief worlds (say).
There should be no suitable concept generator with such individuals in its domain,
since any concept that a concept generator maps such individuals to will fail to be
reliable and acquaintance-based: together these two conditions imply that the
attitude holder must be acquainted with her epistemic alternatives in the actual
world, which in turn requires her epistemic alternatives to be inhabitants of the
actual world.
Nor is it obvious how to constrain the syntax in a principled fashion to prevent
generation of hybrid de se–de re LFs. One cannot simply stipulate that a bound
variable expression cannot be embedded in a resP: Charlow and Sharvit (2014)
argue convincingly that the concept generator technology is needed to account for
de re readings of quantifiers, where the trace of a QR-ed phrase is embedded in a
resP as shown schematically in (34).
(34) [Mary thinks [λG1 [every linguist λx2 [resP G1 t2] is smart]]].
In fact, Charlow and Sharvit point out that it is necessary to permit de se pronouns to
be embedded in resPs in order to account for cases involving multiple attitude
predicates:




(35) Sue thinks John believes she’s a total bore.
(Charlow and Sharvit 2014, p. 39, fn. 25)
On a natural reading of (35), she is construed de se with respect to Sue’s belief state,
but de re with respect to John’s. The LF should thus be as in (36). (We ignore the
complication that John is also de re.)
(36) [CP1λw1 [w1 Sue thinks [CP2λx2λw2 [w2 John believes [CP3 λG4λx5λw6
[w6 [resP G4 she2 w6 x5] is a total bore]]]]]].
It seems then that hybrid de se–de re LFs should only be ruled out when the pronoun
and the concept generator variable are bound from operators in the left periphery of
the same minimal clause. Charlow and Sharvit leave this apparent overgeneration
problem as an open issue.
Notice though that there would be no overgeneration if the definition of
suitability were amended to yield correct predictions for cases where the concept
generator takes as its argument a variable that ranges over the attitude holder’s
candidates for herself. If so, then there would be no need to constrain the syntax in
such a way as to rule out hybrid de se–de re LFs. This is the approach that will be
pursued in this paper. Since as its stands the definition of suitability does not ensure
that concept generators handle epistemic alternatives correctly, we can modify it in
such a way that concept generators treat epistemic alternatives as a special case. Our
strategy will be to formulate a revised definition that ensures that the following
holds:
(37) New constraint on suitability (first version)
G is a suitable concept generator for x in w only if for any individuals y
and z that are epistemic alternatives of x in w, G(y) = G(z);
where y is an epistemic alternative of x in w iff there is some w’ such that
it is compatible with x’s mental state or speech act in w for w’ to be w
and x identifies herself as y in w’.
A simple way to guarantee (37) is to pick some individual u that stands in a
systematic relation to each of the attitude holder’s epistemic alternatives y, and
stipulate that for any such y, G(y) = G(u). An excellent candidate for this individual
is the attitude holder herself (since any y then bears the ‘is an epistemic alternative
of’ relation to u). We have:
(38) New constraint on suitability (final version)
G is a suitable concept generator for x in w only if for any individual y such
that y is an epistemic alternative of x in w, G(y) = G(x).
This requires the following disjunctive definition of suitability for concept
generators:
The interpretation of the logophoric pronoun in Ewe 91
123
(39) Suitable concept generator (final version)
A concept generator G is suitable for x in w iff for all u in the domain of G:
(i) either (a) G(u)(w, x) = u, or (b) u is an epistemic alternative of x in
w and G(u)(w, x) = x; Reliability
(ii) there is an acquaintance relation R such that: Acquaintance-based
(a) for all world-individual pairs \w’, y[ in the domain of G(u),
y bears R uniquely to G(u)(w’, y) in w’ and
(b) if u is an epistemic alternative of x in w, then for all world-individual
pairs \w’, y[ in the domain of G(u), y bears R uniquely to
G(x)(w’, y) in w’.
We assume a theory of world-bound individuals, where no individual inhabits more
than one world. This ensures that for any individual in the domain of a suitable
concept generator, exactly one of the disjuncts in clause (i) applies. To see this,
notice that given (ii.a), any individual u of which (i.a) is true is such that x bears
some acquaintance relation uniquely to u in w. This entails that such a u is a world-
mate of x. Furthermore, any individual u of which (i.b) is true is an epistemic
alternative of the attitude holder x, and therefore not a world-mate of x, but rather an
inhabitant of some world w’ compatible with x’s mental state or speech act. Since
no individual can at once be a world-mate of x and not a world-mate of x, it follows
that for each element of the domain of the concept generator, either the first or the
second disjunct of (i) applies, but not both.16 To see that (39) ensures that the
constraint on suitability in (38) holds, notice that (ii) entails that if G is suitable for x
in w, then for any epistemic alternative u of x, G(u)(w’, y) = G(x)(w’, y), for every
element of the domain of G(u) and G(x).17
The proposal is that when a concept generator is fed a variable over the attitude
holder’s epistemic alternatives, this argument is overwritten with the attitude holder
itself. This mimics de re construal with the attitude holder as res, predicting that a
pronoun bound by an attitude verb and embedded in a resP is read de re, with the
attitude holder as antecedent.
Our proposal places the burden of dealing with hybrid de se–de re configurations
on the semantics, in the form of an amendment to the theory of concept generators,
rather than on the syntax. How successful it is will depend on whether we can find
evidence that there are such configurations, and that they receive the predicted de re
16 To see what sort of trouble could arise if we did not assume a theory of world-bound individuals,
consider a case like Charlow and Sharvit’s except that Sue has not one but two candidates for herself: her
epistemic alternatives are Mary and Polly. If individuals could inhabit more than one world, there could
be a suitable concept generator G for Sue in w such that G(Mary)(w, Sue) = Mary and G(Polly)
(w, Sue) = Polly (by (i.a)). Such a concept generator would have to map Mary and Polly to distinct
concepts - one that returns Mary in the actual world, and another that returns Polly. Yet unless the
embedded clause contains more than one distinct DP, each construed de re, a de re belief should be
mediated by a single concept that the attitude holder has of a single individual, not by multiple concepts
that she has of multiple individuals.
17 Clause (i.b) of (39) is then strictly speaking redundant; how reliability applies to epistemic alternatives
could be deduced from (ii) given the proviso that if u is a world-mate of x in w, then G(u)(w, x) = u . (We
assume that the domain of a concept generator includes only world-mates and epistemic alternatives of




interpretation. Such a configuration will in many cases be indistinguishable from a
simpler one where the pronoun remains free and is embedded in a resP; indeed we
might speculate that economy considerations dictate that a pronoun that can be free
will never occur in a hybrid de se–de re configuration. But this configuration will be
identifiable if there are pronouns that are obligatorily bound in the scope of an
attitude predicate, and which can be construed de re. We will argue that the
logophoric pronoun in Ewe is precisely such an element; the configuration that
permits it to be interpreted de re is shown schematically in (40).
(40) [α … Vatt[log] … [λGj λxi[log] … [ … [resP Gj yèi[log] …] …]]]
By maintaining Heim and von Stechow’s idea that yè bears a feature that must be
checked under binding by an attitude verb, this proposal reconciles the de re
interpretation of yè with its distribution. One question that it gives rise to is why
obligatorily controlled PRO cannot be construed de re—why can it not also be
embedded in a resP? In Sect. 7.1, we propose that only logophoric elements that can
take a long-distance antecedent when embedded below more than one attitude verb
can be construed de re. This is because in such a configuration, such elements are
necessarily interpreted de re with respect to the most local attitude holder. Since
embedding of a pronoun in a resP involves additional covert structure, economy
considerations dictate that it is a last resort option. Consequently, elements such as
PRO that can only take a local antecedent are obligatorily interpreted de se.
In Sect. 7.2, we show that an appealing aspect of our proposal is that it can be
applied to puzzles concerning binding of de re reflexives (Heim 1994; Sharvit
2011). But first, let us take a closer look at the Ewe data.
3 Introducing the Ewe data
3.1 Background on the consultants and elicitation technique
Ewe is a Niger-Congo language spoken in Ghana and Togo. Our data were collected in a
series of elicitation sessions with five bilingual Ewe/French speakers (henceforth
‘Consultants 1–5’). We worked with speakers of two dialects: Mina, spoken in Togo’s
capital city Lomé, and so-called ‘pure Ewe’, spoken in Ghana and other parts of Togo.
Consultants 1, 2, and5 areMina speakers, andConsultants 3 and 4 are pureEwe speakers.
Consultant 1 was born in Lomé and moved to the U.S. at the age of twelve. The
language of instruction during his education in Togo was French, but Ewe was the
language spoken in the home, and he still speaks it regularly with his parents.
Elicitation sessions with Consultant 1 took place in Cambridge, Mass, roughly every
two weeks over a period of about a year. After this period, a smaller number of
judgments were elicited via email for clarification or for testing of predictions.
Elicitation work with Consultants 2–5 was held over Skype in a series of between
2 and 8 one-hour sessions. These were also occasionally supplemented with follow-
up questions over email. At the time of this work, Consultants 2–4 had been living
outside Togo for six or seven years (in Scotland, India, and Belgium respectively).
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They continue to speak Ewe regularly with family or friends. Consultant 5 is our
only Ewe speaker still living in Togo.
Both in-person elicitation sessions and those held over Skype were recorded as
audio files; these recordings were supplemented with typed notes. For Skype
appointments, the facility to type instant messages while talking was used for
displaying test sentences, in order to mitigate any risk of misunderstanding. For
some Skype calls the video function was used, depending on the preferences of the
consultant and the quality of the internet connection.
The data collected took the form of binary judgments of grammaticality and of
truth/falsity relative to scenarios described by the researcher. The consultants’
spontaneous comments about the reasons for their answers were also noted down.
Due to the subtlety of judgments bearing on the de se/de re distinction, the ideal
approach is to repeat core de re scenarios across sessions, with judgments of
truth/falsity of particular attitude reports relative to these scenarios being elicited
afresh each time, either with identical sentences to those tested in previous sessions
or with a different attitude verb. This strategy was employed in the long-term work
with Consultant 1; his judgments concerning attitude reports used in these scenarios
were highly stable across the one-year period of research. It was also possible to
adopt this strategy, though to a lesser extent, in the 7 or 8 sessions with Consultants
2–4. Since there were only 2 sessions with Consultant 5, it was not possible to test
the core semantic judgments with him across more than one session.
3.2 Basic distributional data concerning yè
The pioneering work of Clements (1975) established several generalizations
concerning the distribution of yè.18 These are mostly corroborated by our findings.
The occurrence of yè in the scope of attitude verbs is a robust fact. Thus the
following examples are grammatical.19
(41) a. Kofi be yè dzo.
Kofi say LOG leave
‘Kofii said that hei/*j left.’
b. E koudron be yè la va.
3SG dream COMPL LOG INGR come
‘He/shei dreamed that he/shei/*j will come.’
c. John bòu be yè nyi honvi.
John think COMPL LOG COP stupid
‘Johni thinks that hei/*j is stupid.’
18 More recent fieldwork on yè is reported in Orita (2009). Orita did not investigate whether the logophor
is obligatorily construed de se, however.
19 The data in (41) suggest that be can be used as a verb meaning ‘say’ (41a), and as a complementizer
(41b, c). On the other hand, Consultant 1’s intuition about cases of the former type was that a verb
meaning ‘say’ has been deleted, and that be means roughly ‘that’ in these cases, too. We have not
investigated the properties of the two uses of be in sufficient depth to justify one analysis over the other.
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By contrast, yè cannot be used with third person reference in a simple matrix clause;




A more surprising finding is that for Consultants 2, 4, and 5, yé can be licensed if it
is a component of the complex reflexive yè ɖokui, including in non-attitudinal
environments:21
(43) %Kofi ponu na yè ɖokui.
Kofi talk PRP LOG REFL
‘Kofi talked to himself.’
For these speakers, the distribution of yè is somewhat broader than traditionally
assumed for logophoric pronouns. One way to account for this is to follow Kratzer
(2009) in positing a feature [reflexive] on the functional head v. It seems that for the
speakers for whom (43) is acceptable, yè can be born with either [log] or [reflexive].
If the latter, then this feature is checked under binding by v, and is a licit component
of a complex reflexive.22
Additionally, (44a) shows that when the embedding verb is not an attitude
predicate, yè is unavailable. The sentence providing the intended meaning is given
in (44b).23
20 Intriguingly, use of yè as a first person pronoun is marginally acceptable for Consultant 5:





It is tempting to think of this as evidence that yè is an optionally shifting indexical in Consultant 5’s
dialect. However, one would then have to explain why yè is unlike typical shifting indexicals, first in
being only marginally acceptable in unembedded contexts and second in admitting a de re reading. We
leave this matter to future research.
21 We use ‘%’ to indicate acceptability for a proper subset of our consultants.
22 Consultant 2 did not find yè acceptable in reflexive environments in every case that we tried. We leave
it to future research to investigate the conditions governing the occurrence of yè as part of a complex
reflexive.
23 For Consultant 5, wɔ is not an acceptable gloss for English ‘cause’. He offered instead yena, and
judged the counterpart of (44a) with this verb unacceptable.
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(44) a. *Kofi wɔ be yè dzo.
Kofi do COMPL LOG leave
b. Kofi wɔ be e dzo.
Kofi do COMPL 3SG leave
‘Kofi caused himself to leave.’
Clements noted that yè may occur in an unembedded sentence if the sentence
preceding it contains an attitude predicate, in which case it must denote the attitude
holder associated with the predicate in this earlier sentence. Our data support this
claim:
(45) Kofi koudrin be yè bidzi. Marie zu yè.
Kofi dream COMPL LOG angry Mary insult LOG
‘Kofii dreamed that hei was angry. Mary insulted himi.’
Note that this configuration has semantic consequences: our consultants interpret yè
in the second sentence as occurring in the scope of an attitude, by drawing an
inference either that the insult took place in the dream or that the discourse reports
Kofi describing the dream to Mary.
Our data also verify Clements’ claim that logophors are used “to distinguish
reference to the individual whose speech, thoughts, or feelings are reported or
reflected in a given linguistic context, from reference to other individuals”
(Clements 1975, p. 141)—the attitude holder in our terms. Revisiting the data in
(41), we thus see that yè necessarily refers to the reported speaker, dreamer or
thinker. This pattern extends to attitude reports involving predicates that take two
nominal arguments. In (46) yè necessarily refers to the reported speaker rather than
the addressee.
(46) Kofi gblon na Marie be yè dzo.
Kofi say PRP Mary COMPL LOG leave
‘Kofi told Marie that he/*she left.’
Clements also observed that when yè occurs below multiple attitude predicates, it can
refer to any of the higher attitude holders; thus the requirement that yè find a higher
antecedent appears not to be restricted by locality. Our data corroborate this finding:
(47) Marie be Kofi xɔse be yè na yè cadeau.
Mary say Kofi believe COMPL LOG give LOG gift
(i) ‘Mary said that Kofi believed that she gave him a gift.’
(ii) ‘Mary said that Kofi believed that he gave her a gift.’
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Yè preferentially occurs with a third person antecedent:24,25,26
(48) M xɔse be *yè/m nyi sukuvi nyoe de.
1SG believe COMPL LOG/1SG COP student good ART
Intended: ‘I believe that I am a good student.’
(49) O xɔse be *yè/o nyi sukuvi nyoe de.
2SG believe COMPL LOG/2SG COP student good ART
Intended: ‘You believe that you are a good student.’
This is a different finding from that reported by Clements, which was that yè may
have either a second or a third person antecedent. Another point of divergence is
that Clements reported that where the plain pronoun is used in the scope of an
attitude predicate, it cannot denote the attitude holder. This construal is available for
two of our Mina speakers, however (Consultants 1 and 5):
(50) a. Kofi be e dzo.
Kofi say 3SG leave
‘Kofii said that hei/j left.’
b. E koudron be e la va.
3SG dream COMPL 3SG INGR come
‘Hei dreamed that hei/j will come.’
c. John bòu be e nyi honvi.
John think COMPL 3SG COP stupid
‘Johni thinks that hei/j is stupid.’
24 Consultant 1’s judgments concerning a second person antecedent with yè are not uniform. He found (i)
acceptable, but only if it reports the addressee’s words faithfully. For instance, (i) is unacceptable in a
scenario where the verb used by the addressee was yi ‘go’ rather than dzo, in which case (ii) should be
used instead.
(i) O gblon be yè dzo.
2SG say COMPL LOG leave
‘You said that you left.’
(ii) O gblon be o dzo.
2SG say COMPL 2SG leave
‘You said that you left.’
We do not have an account of these facts, which suggest that in addition to its use in indirect discourse, a
(semi-)quotational use of yè may be marginally available.
25 There is dialect variation in the preferred form of the first and second person pronouns: we find me in
addition to m, and e in addition to o. Here we use m and o, which are primarily associated with Mina.
26 Interestingly, yè with a first person antecedent was judged acceptable (if dispreferred) by a sixth
speaker, whose intuitions are not reported elsewhere in this paper because we were not able to elicit the
crucial semantic judgments from her due to time constraints. This consultant, who is a Mina speaker
herself, associated use of yè with a first person antecedent with the dialect of Ewe spoken in Atakpamé, to
the north of Lomé. It would be worthwhile to investigate this directly with Ewe speakers from this area,
since it could potentially falsify the prediction of Schlenker (2003) that logophoric pronouns never occur
in the first person.
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4 The interpretation of yè
4.1 De re construal of yè
The main piece of evidence that yè is not obligatorily interpreted de se is that an
attitude report with yè can truthfully be used to describe a ‘de re’ scenario involving
mistaken identity. Considerable care is needed in the elicitation of these judgments and
interpretation of the data. Since we are concerned with an ambiguity, a judgment of an
attitude report with yè as false in a mistaken identity scenario does not constitute
conclusive evidence that yè lacks the de re reading; itmay simply be that the consultant
interprets the report with respect to the de se reading. Indeed, for many English
speakers, it seems that the de se reading is the preferred interpretation of an ordinary
pronoun; as anecdotal evidence, it is common for audiencemembers in talks or classes
on the de se/de re distinction to object that they cannot detect the de re reading. Given
this background, it is striking to note that four of our five speakers judged the following
attitude reports with yè as true in mistaken identity scenarios. (Consultant 3 did not
share these judgments; we will return to this issue in a moment.)
Our first example is repeated from (9) in the Introduction; further evidence is
presented in (52)–(55).27
(51) Scenario: John has just found an old paper that he wrote, but he doesn’t
realize that he is the author of the paper. He reads it and is impressed by
what a good paper it is. He says, “Whoever wrote this paper is clever.”
John be yè le cleva.
John say LOG COP clever
‘John said that he was clever.’
(52) a. Scenario: John is in the grocery store. He sees a trail of sugar going up
and down the aisles. He realizes it must have been made by someone
carrying a bag of sugar with a hole in it. He wonders who the shopper
with the torn bag of sugar is, so that he can tell him. He thinks that
that guy, whoever he is, is stupid. What he doesn’t realize is that the
guy with the torn bag of sugar is him!28,29
John bòu be yè nyi honvi.
John think COMPL LOG COP stupid
‘Johni thinks that hei is stupid.’
27 Consultant 2 judged (51) false, but its counterparts with xɔse (‘believe’) and gblon (‘say’) true. His
comments suggest that he may have been interpreting (51) as a (semi-)quotation.
28 Based on a narrative employed by Perry (1979) to illustrate the de se nature of first person pronouns.,
29 Consultant 5 had difficulty detecting the de re reading with this case, but detected it with (51) and (54).
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b. Scenario: As in (52a), except that John articulates out loud his thought
that the shopper with the torn bag of sugar is stupid.
John be yè nyi honvi.
John say LOG COP stupid
‘John said that he was stupid.’
(53) a. Scenario: ‘We interview John, but while we interview him, a hidden
camera photographs him from the back. Meanwhile, this image is
projected in front of him, and presented as though it is pre-filmed
footage of another person. We ask John his impression of that person
in the film, and he says “It’s a criminal.”’30
John gblonbe yè nyi fianfitɔ.
John say COMPL LOG COP thief
‘John said that he was a thief.’
b. Scenario: As in (53a), but John thinks rather than says that the person
is a criminal.
John xɔse be yè nyi fianfitɔ.
John believe COMPL LOG COP thief
‘John believes that he is a thief’.
(54) Scenario: Following a spate of burglaries, a policeman was alerted by
CCTV operators that someone was acting suspiciously, and chased after that
individual, unaware that it was himself.31,32
Sodza xɔse be yè nyi fianfitɔ.
Policeman believe COMPL LOG COP thief
‘The policemani believed that hei was a thief.’
Only Consultant 3 judged these examples to be false. This is compatible with either
(i) yè being obligatorily de se in Consultant 3’s grammar or (ii) Consultant 3 having
a strong preference for the de se construal when confronted with a de se/de re
ambiguity. To decide between these options, we investigated his judgments of
French attitude reports with an embedded ordinary pronoun that is interpreted as
coreferential with the attitude holder. The results provide evidence for (ii); for
example, (55) was judged false in the scenario described in (53).
30 Scenario quoted from Percus and Sauerland (2003a, p. 228).
31 This is an event that actually happened. Instead of describing the story to our consultants we had them read
a short news report about it, retrieved from http://uk.news.yahoo.com/policeman-‘chased-himself’-for-
20-minutes-while-looking-for-suspect.html. We learned about this story from Robert Truswell.
32 Consultant 2 initially judged (54) to be false. However, evidence for a de re reading of yè in this
example comes from his judgments about (54) as a possible answer to the question, “Who did the
policeman believe was a thief?”, asked by someone who had not fully understood the story. Consultant 2
judged (54) an appropriate answer to this question.
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(55) Johni croit qu’ili est voleur.
Johni believes that hei is a thief.
Given the French data, we cannot establish whether yè is ambiguous in Consultant
3’s grammar solely on the basis of his judgments concerning mistaken identity
scenarios. We therefore elicited his judgments about reports of dreams involving so-
called ‘counter-identity’. A property of dream reports discussed in Heim (1994),
Lakoff (1970), and Percus and Sauerland (2003b) is their ability to describe
scenarios where the counterpart of the attitude holder in the dream is some
individual other than herself. Consider the following example.
(56) John dreamed that he was Barack Obama and he gave himself a gift.
A salient reading of this sentence is that in the dream, the speaker’s ‘dream self’ is
Obama, and this individual gives a gift to the attitude holder’s ‘actual self’, John. On
this reading, the subject of the second conjunct is construed de se, and the reflexive
is construed de re. Once it has been established that the speaker’s dream self is
Obama, then, any de se pronoun in this environment cannot fail to pick out Obama.
To show that this is the case, we will first consider a dream report with no reflexive,
only a de se pronoun in subject position.
(57) In John’s dream he was Barack Obama. He dreamt that he won the Nobel
Peace Prize.
Given the lexical entry for dream in (58), the interpretation of the second sentence is
as in (59).
(58) ⟦dreamde se⟧c,g = λP\e,\s,t[[λxeλws. 8\w’, y[ 2 dreamx,w, P(y)(w’)
where dreamx,w = {\w’, y[: what x dreams in w is true in w’ and x
identifies y as herself in w’}
(59) a. [λw1 [w1 John dreamed [λx2λw3 [w3 he2 won the Nobel Peace Prize]]]]
b. ⟦59a⟧c,g = λw. 8\w’, y[2 dreamJohn,w, y wins the Nobel Peace
Prize in w’.
Dream is a universal quantifier over world-individual pairs \w’, y[ such that it is
compatible with what the attitude holder dreams for her to be y in w’. But we have
set up a context that entails that in John’s dream, he is Barack Obama. Thus for any
world-individual pair \w’, y[ that is a member of John’s dream-alternatives, y is
Obama. It is this individual who wins the Nobel Peace Prize according to the dream
report. This shows that if a pronoun is construed de se in a dream report, and if in
the dream the dreamer is some individual other than who she actually is, then the
pronoun must pick out that other individual.
This makes a clear prediction concerning yè: if in Consultant 3’s grammar it is
obligatorily construed de se, then in dream reports yè should unambiguously pick out
the individual that the attitude holder dreams that she is. This prediction is not borne
100 H. Pearson
123
out. Consultant 3 judged (60) true in a situation where in the reported dream Barack
Obama (or rather, John in the guise of Barack Obama) watched John give John a gift:
(60) John koudrin be yè nyi Barack Obama
John dream COMPL LOG COP Barack Obama
koudo yè na yè cadeau.
CONJ LOG give LOG gift
‘John dreamed that he was Barack Obama and he gave himself a gift.’
We conclude that yè has a de re reading in both Mina and ‘pure’ Ewe.
4.2 De se construal of yè
In addition to being judged true in a mistaken identity scenario, an attitude report
incorporating yè is also judged true in a de se scenario, where the reported attitude is
first personal. For example, (51) from the last subsection is judged true in the
scenario below.
(61) Scenario: John has just found an old paper that he wrote. He reads it and is
proud of what a good paper it is. He says, “I am clever.”
John be yè le cleva.
John say LOG COP clever
‘John said that he was clever.’
Given the theoretical framework laid out in Sect. 2, we might conclude that on the
relevant reading, (61) has the following LF, where yè is bound by the attitude verb:
(62) [λw1 [w1 John said [λx2λw3 [w3 yè2 was clever]]]]
However, an anonymous reviewer points out that the truth of (61) in a de se scenario
is insufficient to demonstrate that the sentence has a de se LF. As is well known, a
de se construal can also be obtained by interpreting the pronoun de re relative to the
acquaintance relation of identity. To show that yè can be bound as in (62), we use an
argument borrowed from Percus and Sauerland (2003a). Percus and Sauerland
discuss scenarios where every member of a group has a particular belief about
herself (that she is clever, say), but this belief is first personal for only one member
of the group. Consider (63).
(63) Scenario: John, Mary, Sue, and Bill have all been reading old papers of theirs
from when they were in college (John reads a paper John wrote, Mary reads a
paper Mary wrote, etc.) Each of them is impressed by the paper and takes it as
a sign that its author is clever. However, only John is aware that he is the
author of the paper that he read—everyone else fails to recognize their own
work. So John says, “I am clever,” and Mary, Sue and Bill each say,
“Whoever wrote this paper is clever.”
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There is a reading of the English sentence Only John said that he was clever where it
is true in this scenario. The sentence is expected to be true if the verb phrase said
that he was clever expresses a property that is true of John but not of any other
salient individual. This is the case on a reading where he is bound by say, since in
the given scenario, no other individual said that she (de se) was clever. However, it
would not be the case if the sentence were assigned a de re LF; in that case, the
property expressed by the verb phrase would be true of any individual that bears
some acquaintance relation R to herself such that she said that the individual to
whom she bears R is clever. In the scenario in (63), this property is true of every
salient individual: the existential quantification is witnessed by the identity
acquaintance relation for John, and by the ‘read the paper of’ relation for everyone
else. According to Percus and Sauerland’s reasoning, this shows that there is a
dedicated de se LF for Only John said that he was clever. We can use the same
argumentation to show that yè can be bound by an attitude predicate: (64) is judged
true in the scenario we have been considering.
(64) John deka yé be yè le cleva.
John only FOC say LOG COP clever
‘Only John said that he was clever.’
In the next section, we argue that yè not only can be bound by an attitude verb,
but in fact must be. We argue that by appeal to the hybrid de se–de re LFs
discussed in Sect. 2.4, this proposal can be reconciled with their ability to be
read de re.
5 Reconciling the distribution of yè with its interpretation
5.1 The Heim–von Stechow view
We saw in Sect. 2.1 that Heim and von Stechow provided a straightforward account
of why yè has the distribution that it does. According to this view, yè obligatorily
occurs in the scope of an attitude predicate and takes the attitude holder as its
antecedent because it bears an uninterpretable feature [log] that must be checked via
binding by the individual abstractor that such a predicate introduces. A sample LF is
provided in (65).
(65) [CP1λw1 [w1 John said[log] [CP2λx2[log]λw3[w3 yè2[log] was clever]]]]
Since the possibility was not considered that this operator-variable configuration
might interact with additional covert structure—a concept generator variable
introduced by a resP in which yè is embedded, as described in Sect. 2.4—it was
predicted that yè cannot be read de re, contrary to the facts laid out in the last
section. In this subsection, we consider in greater detail the advantages of Heim and
von Stechow’s idea that make it worthwhile to attempt to reconcile their approach
with the de se/de re ambiguity of yè. In Sect. 5.2 the Heim–von Stechow approach is
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contrasted with an alternative account of the distribution of yè that does not require
it to be bound by an attitude predicate. According to this alternative view, yè is
instead required to be bound by the attitude holder DP itself.33 We argue that the
Heim–von Stechow view is more successful than this approach in accounting for the
distribution of yè. In Sect. 5.3, we show in greater detail how the assumption that the
grammar makes available hybrid de se–de re LFs as described in Sect. 2.4 enables
this proposal to be reconciled with the de se/de re ambiguity exhibited by yè.
The idea that logophoric pronouns bear a formal feature requiring them to be
bound by an attitude verb provides a means of formulating a constraint that has clear
semantic consequences. Recall that yè can be licensed by an attitude verb in a
previous sentence:
(66) Kofi be yè bidzi. Marie zu yè.
Kofi say LOG angry. Mary insult LOG
‘Kofii said that hei was angry. Mary insulted himi.’
Example (66) requires that Kofi said that Mary insulted him. This is reminiscent of
the well-known phenomenon of modal subordination, discussed in Roberts (1989).
(67) A thief might break into the house. He would take the silver.
Intuitively, the second sentence in (67) is interpreted with respect to those worlds
quantified over by the modal in the first sentence—that is, those where a thief breaks
into the house. Similarly, the second sentence in (66) is interpreted with respect to the
(centred) worlds quantified over by say in the first sentence. In both cases, the scope of
the modal seems to be extended over the second sentence. The presence of yè forces
this to be the case, presumably because of the requirement that yè be interpreted in the
scope of an attitude. This idea can be formulated in Heim’s and von Stechow’s terms
by letting the requirement of binding by an attitude predicate imposed by the feature
[log] be satisfied by an attitude predicate in a preceding sentence.Whilemore needs to
be said about how this comes about, an approach along these lines seems promising
given the independent evidence from other corners of the grammar that the scope of
modal operators can be ‘extended’ across sentences.
An additional advantage of the Heim–von Stechow view is that it provides an
explanation of why yè is not licensed in the scope of ordinary modal quantifiers that
are not attitude predicates. The following example, repeated from (44a) in Sect. 3.2,
reminds us of this constraint.
(68) *Kofi wɔ be yè dzo.
Kofi do COMPL LOG leave
Intended: ‘Kofi caused himself to leave.’
Since cause carries no entailments about the mental state of its agent, it is an
ordinary modal quantifier rather than an attitude predicate, and introduces a world
abstractor but not an individual abstractor. Yet licensing of [log] on yè requires an
33 We thank an anonymous reviewer for prompting us to think about this alternative in greater detail.
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individual abstractor, since yè is not of an appropriate type to be bound by a world
binder. Hence in (68) the licensing condition on yè is correctly predicted not to be
satisfied. Notice that a syntactic condition requiring yè to occur in an embedded
clause would not be enough to explain (68): the distribution of yè is constrained by
the semantics of the predicate that introduces it, and hence a theory of this
distribution should make reference to semantic notions.
Finally, the Heim–von Stechow view accounts for the observation in (46) above
that when yè is introduced by a three-place attitude verb, it is the DP that denotes the
bearer of the reported attitude that acts as the antecedent. Here is a reminder of the
relevant data.
(69) Kofi gblon na Marie be yè dzo.
Kofi say PRP Mary COMPL LOG leave
‘Kofi told Marie that he/*she left.’
Binding of yè by the attitude predicate straightforwardly predicts the impossibility
of yè picking out Mary in (69). To show this, we need a lexical entry for the variant
of say that takes two nominal arguments (70). (71) computes the interpretation.
(70) ⟦sayde se/3-place⟧c,g = λxeλP\e,\s,t[[λyeλws. 8\w’, z[2 sayy,x,w, P(z)(w’)
where sayy,x,w = {\w’, z[: what y says to x in w is true in w’
and y identifies z as herself in w’}
(71) a. Kofi said to Mary that yè left.
b. [CP1λw1 [w1 Kofi said[log] to Mary [CP2λx2[log]λw3 [w3 yè2[log] left]]]]
c. ⟦CP1⟧c,g = λw. 8\w’, z[ 2 sayKofi,Mary,w, z left in w’
In (71), the property of leaving is applied to epistemic alternatives of Kofi rather
than Mary. If yè is abstracted over, then the resulting interpretation cannot fail to be
one where Kofi is the antecedent of yè. Once again, the Heim–von Stechow view
makes the right prediction.
5.2 An alternative account
Whatever its successes in accounting for the distribution of yè, the discovery that yè
can be construed de re presents a serious challenge to the Heim–von Stechow view
in its original form. In this subsection, we explore an alternative view that correctly
predicts that the distribution of yè is confined to attitude reports, and that it must
denote the attitude holder. We show, however, that unlike the Heim–von Stechow
view, this account overgenerates.
Suppose we adopt Heim and von Stechow’s assumption that attitude verbs
introduce an uninterpretable feature [log] into the derivation, but say that they pass
this feature on to one of the DPs in the matrix clause, thereby marking it as the
attitude holder. It would follow from such an amendment that yè need not be bound
by the abstractor introduced by the attitude verb: assuming that the subject of say
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undergoes QR and passes its [log] feature to the binder, this operator could also
check yè’s [log] feature, as shown in (72).
(72) [CP1λw1 [w1 John λx2[log] said[log] (to Mary) [CP2λx3[log]λw4
[w4 yè2/3[log] was clever]]]]
The de se/de re ambiguity of yè follows: binding by the higher abstractor is
compatible with the de re reading, and binding by the lower one yields the de se
reading.34 This account correctly predicts that the distribution of yè is confined to
attitude reports (or to attitude reports and reflexive environments), since it carries
over from the Heim–von Stechow account the idea of making the licensing of yè
dependent upon some feature that is introduced into the derivation by an attitude
verb.35 Moreover, it retains the prediction that yè picks out the attitude holder, since
this follows from either of the two binding options that are available according to
this view. However, the account fails to exclude configurations where yè falls
outside the scope of the attitude verb. In particular, it incorrectly predicts that for
Consultants 1 and 3, for whom yè is ungrammatical in non-attitudinal reflexive
environments, yè ɖokui should be licensed in the matrix clause of an attitude report:
(73) Kofi gblon na *yè/e ɖokui be yè le cleva.
Kofi say PRP LOG/3SG REFL COMPL LOG COP clever
‘Kofi said to himself that he was clever.’
Here [log] on the first occurrence of yè should be checked under binding by the
attitude holder, yet yè is unlicensed. Stipulating that yè’s licensor cannot occur in the
same minimal IP as yè will not help, since this would fail to predict the acceptability
of yè under coindexation with a higher yè in the same IP, as in (74):
(74) John koudrin be yè nyi Barack Obama
John dream COMPL LOG COP Barack Obama
koudo yè na yè ɖokui cadeau.
CONJ LOG give LOG REFL gift
‘John dreamed that he was Barack Obama and he gave himself a gift’.
We conclude that unlike the Heim–von Stechow view, this proposal cannot
straightforwardly account for the distribution of yè. In the next subsection, we show
how the semantic judgments presented in this paper can be reconciled with the
Heim–von Stechow view by appealing to the hybrid de se–de re LFs introduced in
Sect. 2.4.
34 Given the approach to de re that we assume, yè would be embedded in a resP in order to yield the de re
reading.
35 We continue to assume that for speakers for whom yè can occur as part of a complex reflexive in a
simple matrix sentence, it can be born with the feature [reflexive] rather than [log].
The interpretation of the logophoric pronoun in Ewe 105
123
5.3 Our proposal
Consider (61), repeated below as (75). Recall that we found that this example is true
in either of the two scenarios given.
(75) Scenario 1: John has just found an old paper that he wrote, but he doesn’t
realize that he is the author of the paper. He reads it and is impressed by
what a good paper it is. He says, “Whoever wrote this paper is clever.”
Scenario 2: John has just found an old paper that he wrote. He reads it and
is proud of what a good paper it is. He says, “I am clever.”
John be yè le cleva.
John say LOG COP clever
‘John said that he was clever.’
We postulate two distinct LFs for (75); these differ minimally from one another in
that one involves a concept generator variable and the other does not. In both cases,
yè is bound by the individual abstractor introduced by say. In the case of the LF
corresponding to Scenario 2, an additional abstractor is introduced which binds the
concept generator variable. Concomitantly, the type of say is different in the two
cases, (76) and (77).
(76) ⟦sayde se⟧c,g = λP\e,\s,t[[λxeλws. 8\w’, y[ 2 sayx,w, P(y)(w’)
where sayx,w = {\w’, y[: what x says in w is true in w’ and x identifies
herself as y in w’}
(77) ⟦sayde re⟧c,g = λΠ\\e,\s,\e,e[[[,\e,\s,t[[[λxeλws. ∃G: G is suitable
for x in w & 8\w’, z[ 2 sayx,w, Π(G)(y)(w’)
where a concept generator G is suitable for x in w iff for all u in the domain
of G:
(i) either (a) G(u)(w, x) = u, or (b) u is an epistemic
alternative of x in w and G(u)(w, x) = x;
Reliability
(ii) there is an acquaintance relation R such that: Acquaintance-based
(a) for all world-individual pairs \w’, y[ in the domain of G(u),
y bears R uniquely to G(u)(w’, y) in w’ and
(b) if u is an epistemic alternative of x in w, then for all world-
individual pairs \w’, y[ in the domain of G(u), y bears R
uniquely to G(x)(w’, y) in w’.
106 H. Pearson
123
Expressions (78) and (79) provide the computations for the de se and de re readings
of (75) respectively.
(78) a. [CP1λw1 [w1 John says[log] [CP2λx2[log]λw3 [w3 yè2[log] is clever]]]]
b. ⟦CP1⟧c,g = λw. 8\w’, y[2 SayJohn,w, y is clever in w’
(79) a. [CP1λw1 [w1 John says[log] [CP2λG2λx3[log]λw4 [w4 [resP G4 yè3[log]
w4 x3] is clever]]]]
b. ⟦CP1⟧c,g = λw. ∃G: G is suitable for John in w & 8\w’, y[ 2
SayJohn,w, G(y)(w’)(y) is clever in w’.
Of these, (78) is the familiar de se case; the sentence is true on this reading in
Scenario 2, but not in Scenario 1. For the latter case, the concept generator comes to
the rescue, as in (79). In this scenario, John reads a paper that he has no memory of
writing and remarks that its author is clever. On the reading in (79), the sentence is
true just in case there is some concept generator G suitable for John such that in all
of John’s say-alternatives \w’, y[, the individual picked out by G applied to y at
\w’, y[ is clever in w’. If G is suitable for John, then for any epistemic alternative
y of John, G(y) = G(John). Consequently, for any say-alternative of John’s \w’, y[,
G(y)(w’)(y’) = G(John)(w’)(y). In Scenario 1, a salient acquaintance relation is that
relation R that x bears to u in w just in case x is reading u’s paper in w; John bears
this relation to himself. Let G be that concept generator such that John bears R to
G(John)(w)(John), and for each of John’s say-alternatives \w’, y[, y bears R to
G(John)(w’)(y) in w’. If so, then at each of John’s say-alternatives \w’, y[, y
bears R to G(y)(w’)(y) in w’. G witnesses the existential quantifier in (79b) in
Scenario 1 as needed.
We now have an explanation of the surprising fact that yè can be construed de re.
In fact, this discovery no longer seems so surprising: the assumption that binding by
an attitude predicate always induces a de se reading seems wrong once we consider
the possibility of hybrid de se–de re LFs. This proposal retains the virtues of Heim’s
and von Stechow’s idea. As with their approach, the account of yè’s distribution is
simply that yè must be bound by an attitude verb.
6 An objection
An anonymous reviewer drew our attention to the following scenario. Suppose that
John is delusional and in a psychiatric hospital; he has been known to proclaim that
he is Napoleon. Watching a television report about a hospital that he does not
recognize as his own, he remarks that the patient that he just saw on TV is
delusional, not realizing that this patient is himself. The reviewer observes the
following pattern of judgments in this scenario:
(80) a. John claims that he is delusional. True (on de re reading)
b. John claims that Napoleon is delusional. False
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The truth of (80a) and falsity of (80b) demonstrate that they have different truth
conditions. We need to check whether this is predicted for the Ewe variant of (80a)
where yè is the subject of the embedded clause. Here are the LFs for the de re
reading of yè and for (80b).
(81) a. [CP1λw1 [w1 John claims[log] [CP2λG2λx3[log]λw4 [w4 [resP G2 yè3[log]
w4 x3] is delusional]]]]
b. [CP1λw1 [w1 John claims[log] [CP2λG2λx3[log]λw4 [w4 [resP G2 Napoleon
w4 x3] is delusional]]]]
Since (81a) is a hybrid de se–de re LF, the argument of the concept generator is a
variable ranging over John’s epistemic alternatives. In the relevant scenario, any
epistemic alternative of John’s should be Napoleon. But in (81b), the concept
generator is fed Napoleon as its argument. So do we, incorrectly, predict that (81a)
and (81b) have the same truth conditions?
What it would take for this prediction to follow from our proposal is for any
concept generator G that is suitable for John in w to be such that for any epistemic
alternative of John’s, y, G(y) = G(Napoleon). But this is not the case. Given that we
assume a theory of world-bound individuals, the proper name Napoleon denotes an
inhabitant of the actual world—namely, the individual Napoleon. A variable that
ranges over John’s epistemic alternatives ranges over inhabitants of worlds
compatible with John’s attitude; such individuals do not inhabit the actual world and
are therefore distinct from the referent of Napoleon. To see that our approach treats
the referent of Napoleon differently from John’s epistemic alternatives, even when
John believes that he is Napoleon, recall our definition of suitability, repeated here
from (39):
(82) Suitable concept generator
A concept generator G is suitable for x in w iff for all u in the domain of G:
(i) either (a) G(u)(w, x) = u, or (b) u is an epistemic alternative of x in w
and G(u)(w, x) = x; Reliability
(ii) there is an acquaintance relation R such that: Acquaintance-based
(a) for all world-individual pairs \w’, y[ in the domain of G(u),
y bears R uniquely to G(u)(w’, y) in w’ and
(b) if u is an epistemic alternative of x in w, then for all world-individual
pairs \w’, y[ in the domain of G(u), y bears R uniquely to
G(x)(w’, y) in w’.
Given a theory of world-bound individuals, any given element of the domain of a
suitable concept generator will satisfy exactly one of the two disjuncts in clause (i)
of (82). In (81a), the argument of the concept generator is a variable ranging over
John’s epistemic alternatives, meaning that the first disjunct applies; in (81b), it is
an inhabitant of the actual world, meaning that the second disjunct applies.
Additionally, clause (ii.b) applies to (81a) but not to (81b). The semantics thus treats
the two sentences differently.
Here are the predicted truth conditions of (81a).
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(83) (81a) is true in w just in case there is some concept generator G such that:
(i) for every epistemic alternative y of John’s, G(y)(w, John) = John;
(ii) for every epistemic alternative y of John’s there is some acquaintance
relation R such that (a) for every \w’, z[ in the domain of G(y), z
bears R uniquely to G(John)(w’, z) in w’, and (b) for every \w’, z[
in the domain of G(y), z bears R uniquely to G(y)(w’, z) in w’;
(iii) for every claim-alternative \w’, y[ of John’s, G(y)(w’, y) is
delusional in w’.
Given that a suitable concept generator treats a variable over epistemic alternatives
of the attitude holder as though it were the attitude holder herself, (83) reduces to
the following:
(84) (81a) is true in w just in case there is some concept generator G such that:
(i) G(John)(w, John) = John;
(ii) there is some acquaintance relation R such that for every \w’, z[
in the domain of G(John), z bears R uniquely to G(John)(w’, z) in w’;
(iii) for every claim-alternative \w’, y[ of John’s, G(John)(w’, y) is
delusional in w’.
These conditions are met in a scenario where John sees himself on television and
says that the man he saw on TV is delusional. The truth of (81a) is thus predicted.
To check that (80b) is correctly derived to be false, consider the predicted truth
conditions of this sentence in (85).
(85) (80b) is true in w just in case there is some concept generator G such that:
(i) G(Napoleon)(w, John) = Napoleon;
(ii) there is some acquaintance relation R such that for every \w’, z[
in the domain of G(Napoleon), z bears R uniquely to
G(Napoleon) (w’, z) in w’;
(iii) for every claim-alternative \w’, y[ of John’s, G(John)(w’, y) is
delusional in w’.
In our scenario, there is no salient acquaintance relation R that John bears to
Napoleon, such that he claims that the individual to whom he bears R is delusional.
The sentence is thus correctly predicted to be false.
7 Consequences of the proposal
If the grammar admits hybrid de se–de re LFs, and these are assigned the
interpretation described in this paper, then it follows that binding by an attitude
predicate is not a sufficient condition for being construed de se. Our analysis
therefore leads us back to a question that had previously seemed to have a
satisfactory answer: why can PRO not be read de re? Section 7.1 sketches a possible
answer to this question. Ultimately, the interpretation of PRO should be reconciled
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not only with that of yè in Ewe, but also with the interpretation of logophors in other
languages. In Sect. 7.2, we survey some results of previous work on this topic.
Finally, in Sect. 7.3, we call attention to an application of our proposal to a well-
known puzzle concerning binding-theoretic effects with de re reflexives (Heim
1994; Sharvit 2011).
7.1 Interpretation of PRO
In light of the possibility of embedding an element that is bound by an attitude
predicate in a resP, the fact that the logophoric pronoun in Ewe can receive a de re
construal is not so surprising after all. If anything is in need of explanation, it is the
existence of elements like obligatorily controlled PRO whose interpretation is
restricted to a de se construal. If the analysis of control in Chierchia (1990) is
correct, then PRO and logophoric pronouns look rather alike. But if yè can in
addition be embedded within a resP, what is to save PRO from the same fate? In this
section, we suggest that the answer to this question lies in the fact that yè can take a
long-distance antecedent but PRO cannot. This is exemplified in (86) and (87).
(86) Marie be Kofi xɔse be yè na yè cadeau.
Mary say Kofi believe COMPL LOG give LOG gift
(i) ‘Mary said that Kofi believed that she gave him a gift.’
(ii) ‘Mary said that Kofi believed that he gave her a gift.’
(87) Kofii believed that Maryj claimed [PRO*i/j to have given himi/*herj a gift].
We propose that this difference between PRO and yè arises because PRO lacks
inherent phi-features and must inherit them from the controller, whereas yè bears
[3rd].36 This is shown in (88) and (89).
(88) a. I claimed PRO to have dressed myself/*yourself/*herself.
b. You claimed PRO to have dressed *myself/yourself/*herself.
c. She claimed PRO to have dressed *myself/*yourself/herself.
(89) *M/*o/Kofi xɔse be yè nyi sukuvi nyoe de.
1SG/2SG/Kofi believe COMPL LOG COP student good ART
*I/*you/Kofi believe that *I am/*you are/he is a good student.’
PRO is a minimal pronoun in the sense of Kratzer (2009): it is born without phi-
features, and inherits them under binding by an operator in C. Crucially, the
abstractor must be within PRO’s local domain; Kratzer assumes that phi-feature
unification can only take place between two elements that are in a sufficiently local
36 If there is a dialect where yè can take first and second person antecedents, future research should
establish whether there are additional differences in the distribution and interpretation of yè in this dialect
relative to the dialects we have investigated. A strong prediction is that in such a dialect, yè, like PRO, is
born without phi-features and cannot take a long-distance antecedent. It would follow from the logic of
this section that yè cannot be read de re in this dialect.
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relationship. PRO therefore cannot take a long-distance antecedent. By contrast, the
presence of [3rd] on yè means that it does not need to find its binder within its own
CP; we assume that checking of uninterpretable features differs from phi-feature
unification in that it can be accomplished by long-distance binding. Consequently,
yè can occur in a configuration such as (87) with more than one attitude verb, and be
bound by the higher of these. We illustrate this schematically below.
(90) a. [DP …att1 … [λx1 [DP … att2 … [λx2 [PRO*1/2 …]]]]]
b. [DP …att1 … [λx1 [DP … att2 … [λx2 [yè1/2 …]]]]]
We have seen that the antecedent of yè is the individual designated as attitude holder
by the predicate that binds it. Where yè takes a long-distance antecedent α, its binder
is the (abstractor introduced by) the attitude verb that designates α as its attitude
holder. Such an abstractor is too far away from PRO to enable phi-feature
unification to take place, leading to the observed locality constraint on the domain in
which PRO finds its controller.
Yet mere binding of yè by a higher abstractor is not sufficient to generate the
interpretation assigned to yè when it takes a long-distance antecedent. To see this,
focus on reading (i) of (86), repeated below.
(91) Marie be Kofi xɔse be yè na yè cadeau.
Mary say Kofi believe COMPL LOG give LOG gift
(i) ‘Mary said that Kofi believed that she gave him a gift.’
(ii) ‘Mary said that Kofi believed that he gave her a gift.’
The sentence is verified on this reading if Mary said, “Kofi believes of me that I
gave him a gift.” Is the higher occurrence of yè construed de se or de re in this case?
It seems to be read de se with respect to Mary’s attitude (as witnessed by the use of
the first person pronoun) and de re with respect to Kofi’s (as witnessed by the use of
the of-phrase to identify Mary as the res). One way to see this is to notice that a
sentence like (91) gives rise to a double vision problem of the kind familiar from
Quine (1956). Consider the following scenario.
(92) Scenario: There is a woman that Kofi has seen at the beach, and a woman
that he has seen wearing a brown hat. He has formed the belief that an
anonymous gift that he recently received was from the woman he saw at the
beach. Unbeknown to him, the woman at the beach and the woman in the
brown hat are one and the same individual. Aware of these facts, Mary
reports them by saying (quite consistently), “Kofi believes that I gave him a
gift” and “Kofi believes that I did not give him a gift.”
Notice that the following sentences are both true in this scenario.
(93) a. Mary said that Kofi believed that she gave him a gift.
b. Mary said that Kofi believed that she did not give him a gift.
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This shows that while the subject of the most deeply embedded clause can (though
need not) be construed de se with respect to Mary’s attitude, it is construed de re
with respect to Kofi’s attitude. Mere binding of yè by a higher abstractor is
insufficient to predict this: if Percus and Sauerland are correct that a de re construal
is mediated by a concept generator, then yè must be embedded in a resP in addition
to being bound by the higher abstractor.
Here is the LF for reading (i) of (91) and its interpretation.37
(94) a. Mary says that Kofi believes that yèMary gives yèKofi a gift.
b. [CP1λw1 [w1 Mary says[log] [CP2λx2[log]λw3 [w3 Kofi believes[log]
[CP3λG4λx5λw6 [w6 [resP G4 yè2[log] w6 x5] gives yè5[log] a gift]]]]]
c. ⟦CP3⟧c,g = λGλxλw. G(g(2))(w)(x) gives x a gift in w.
d. ⟦CP2⟧c,g = λxλw. ∃G: 8\w’, y[ 2 DoxKofi,w, G(x)(w’)(y) gives y
a gift in w’.
e. ⟦CP1⟧c,g = λw. 8\w’, y[ 2 sayMary,w, ∃G: 8\w”, z[
2 DoxKofi,w’, G(y)(w”)(z) gives z a gift in w”.
This, we suggest, is the clue that was already present in Clements’ work to suggest
that logophoric pronouns can after all be interpreted de re. If yè can occur in a
multiply embedded clause and denote some individual other than the immediately
higher attitude holder, then it must be possible for it to be construed de re. The view
that yè is obligatorily bound by an individual abstractor but can in addition be
embedded within a resP thus fits quite elegantly with the ability of yè to denote a
non-local attitude holder.
Embedding of a pronoun in a resP involves positing additional covert structure,
and therefore should only be employed as a last resort for reasons of economy. The
ability to take a long-distance antecedent is the circumstance that can cause the
grammar to resort to this option. It is therefore expected that an element like PRO
that cannot take a long-distance antecedent is obligatorily construed de se.
7.2 Interpretation of logophoric pronouns in other languages
The proposal in the last section makes a clear prediction: any element that is bound
by an attitude predicate and obligatorily takes the most local attitude holder as its
antecedent is necessarily construed de se. This prediction appears to be borne out for
the covert experiencer argument of predicates of personal taste such as fun and tasty
(Pearson 2013a; Stephenson 2007a, b) and the ‘knower’ argument of epistemic
modals (Stephenson 2007a, b). Secondly, we claim that any logophoric element that
can take a long-distance antecedent admits a de re construal, since in this
configuration, it is interpreted de re with respect to the most immediate attitude.
Underlying the approach is the idea that the possibility of embedding a logophoric
element in a resP is a last resort option that becomes available only if it is able to
take a long-distance antecedent.
37 By the same reasoning, ‘Kofi’ should strictly speaking be embedded in a resP too, but we gloss over
this to keep the representations manageable.
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In principle, one can imagine two versions of the last resort option. The first is
what we have already seen in the case of Ewe: the ability of yè to take a long-
distance antecedent triggers the possibility of embedding of yè in a resP—an option
that is available regardless of whether a long-distance antecedent is actually present
in the attitude report in question. The second appears to be instantiated with
logophors in Yoruba (Anand 2006) and Tangale (Haida 2009). In these languages,
the logophor can take a long-distance antecedent, and yet it seems that it is
obligatorily construed de se in mistaken identity scenarios. (95) illustrates the
availability of a long-distance antecedent in Tangale, and (96) exemplifies the de se
construal.
(95) Malaŋ yim-go ká: Tulo: ne: ká: yi
Malang.MASC think-PERF COMPL Tuloo.FEM say COMPL LOG
ŋa mana-m kude.
PROG.have house-LNK big
‘Malangi thinks that Tuloo said that hei has a big house.’
(Haida 2009, p. 9, ex. (12))
(96) Scenario: Awang sees, reflected in a window, the image of a man whose
clothes seem to be dirty. It is Awang’s mirror image, but he does not
recognize the man as himself. He says (pointing to his mirror image):
“Mbe:ndaŋ tashin landan kudekkudek.” ‘He is wearing dirty clothes.’
Awaŋ gá: yi tashin landa-n kudek-kudek.
Awang.MASC say LOG wear cloth-LNK black-black
‘Awangi said that hei is wearing dirty clothes.’ False
(Haida 2009, p. 4, exs. (3), (4))
If the argumentation in the last subsection is correct, then in (95) the logophor must
be read de re with respect to Tuloo’s speech act. Yet (96) suggests that the logophor
is not construed de re in this sentence. Similar facts are reported for Yoruba by
Anand (2006). Notice that for an account where the logophor is merely abstracted
over, it would be mysterious why it can take a long-distance antecedent at all. The
data can be handled in our setup by treating embedding of the logophor as a last
resort option that is highly constrained in Yoruba and Tangale and is only available
when forced by the presence of a long-distance antecedent.
On the other hand, the possibility that there is crosslinguistic variation in whether
logophors admit de re readings raises a serious acquisition problem. Given that the
situations that provide evidence for the available readings rarely occur in everyday
life, how could the child learn whether the logophor in her language has a de re
construal? One option is that there are subtle distributional differences between
logophors in Ewe, on the one hand, and Yoruba and Tangale, on the other, that
could trigger coding of the logophor as ambiguous in the former language and
unambiguously de se in the latter two. We are not currently aware of any such
differences—indeed, it is not clear to us what form these differences would even
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take—but we leave open the possibility that they may be uncovered by future
research. The second option is that the judgments reported for Yoruba and Tangale
merely reflect a preference for the de se interpretation. If so, then de re readings
might be revealed by employing some of the strategies described in this paper. In
particular, in future work on Yoruba and Tangale it would be worth looking at
question-answer pairs of the kind that enabled Consultant 2 to detect the de re
reading (footnote 32), and at dream reports.38
7.3 A new application: two English puzzles
It is worth asking whether there is evidence that hybrid de se–de re LFs are
employed in any other corner of the grammar. In this section, we argue that these
configurations are responsible for Heim’s famous puzzling reflexives in de se
reports. Here is an example.
(97) John dreamt he kissed himself. (Heim 1994, p. 4, ex. (31))
Suppose that John dreamed that he was James Dean and that he, James Dean, kissed
John. (97) is true in this scenario. This shows that he can be construed de se and
himself can be construed de re. How is it that the two pronouns can be assigned these
construals without a Principle A violation arising? Given orthodox assumptions
about binding, the LF that permits he to be construed de se and himself to be bound
in its local domain is (98).
(98) [CP1λw1 [w1 John dreamt [CP2λx2λw3 [w3 he2 kissed himself2]]]]
In (98), he is bound in the usual way, letting it be construed de se. If himself is to
stand a chance of being syntactically bound, it should be coindexed with he. But
then the property expressed by the embedded clause is the one given below:
(99) ⟦CP2⟧c,g = λxλw. x kissed x in w
This is not the reading that we are after: it would mean that some self-kissing went
on in the dream, which is not true of the scenario that we have in mind. Heim
considers two solutions to this problem. One is that himself is not bound in the
embedded clause, but rather from a distance, by the matrix subject. As she notes,
however, this leads to a question about when long-distance binding can occur
generally; something must be said about why *John dreamt that his mother kissed
himself is ungrammatical, for instance. A related idea is to have the reflexive raise
out of the complement clause, letting it be bound locally in the matrix clause; but
this likewise requires a characterization of the conditions under which such
movement is permitted.
38 Parallel research questions can be asked about shifted indexicals, since there is evidence that these are
like Yoruba and Tangale logophors in tolerating long-distance antecedents but not de re scenarios (Anand
and Nevins 2004, Anand 2006). However, any attempt to extend our approach to these cases would have




Sharvit (2011) discusses a variant of the puzzle involving c-command of de re
reflexives by PRO (which is purely de se). Given these data, she proposes that
Binding Theory is sensitive to two types of covaluation of arguments. Type I
covaluation is the usual kind: two expressions are covalued just in case they have
the same semantic value. Type II covaluation is the innovation; this “holds between
two NPs if one of them denotes an attitude holder and the other corresponds to the
‘self’ of the attitude holder” (Sharvit 2011, p. 64). (The reader is referred to the
paper for technical details.) When a de se pronoun c-commands a corresponding de
re reflexive, Principle A is satisfied because the two items are Type II covalued.
Facts like (97) are considerably less puzzling from the perspective developed in
this paper. There is no puzzle as to how Principle A is satisfied because the de re
reflexive is indeed coindexed with the de se subject. It just so happens that this DP is
embedded within a resP, making a de re interpretation available. Here is the LF:
(100) [CP1λw1 [w1 John dreamt [CP2λG2λx3λw4 [w4 he3 kissed [resP G2
himself3 w4 x3]]]]]
We leave the reader to verify that the interpretation of this LF is the desired one. The
crucial point is that the configuration ensures that he is interpreted de se and himself
is interpreted de re, while nonetheless letting these elements be coindexed. No
stipulations about long-distance binding or movement are required as on Heim’s
approach, and no amendment to the Binding Theory is needed as proposed by Sharvit.
Sharvit also shows that coindexing of a de re pronoun with PRO leads to a
Principle B violation in a configuration where a de re reflexive is licit:
(101) Scenario: Sarah Palin, who is running for president, wakes up from a coma
and suffers from severe memory loss: she doesn’t remember that she is
running for president and perhaps doesn’t even know who she is. McCain
visits her in the hospital, and she says to him, “I don’t know who to vote for.”
While the two of them look at a picture of her in the newspaper, he says to
her, “You must vote for this woman.” Palin, who doesn’t recognize herself in
the picture, says, “You are right; I will vote for this woman. She seems
reliable.”
McCain convinced Palini [PROi to vote for *heri/herself].
(Sharvit 2011, p. 56)
Given our approach, this looks like evidence that a de se and a corresponding de re
pronoun not only can be coindexed, but must be. That is, the only route to a de re
construal of her, where her picks out Palin, is coindexing with PRO, and embedding
within a resP.
(102) *[CP1λw1 [w1 McCain convinced Palin [CP2λG2λx3λw4 [w4 PRO3 to vote
for [resP G2 her3 w4 x3]]]]
The Principle B violation in (101) would have been circumvented if the object
pronoun received a different index from that assigned to the individual abstractor
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and PRO. Just why this route should be unavailable is a question that we have to
leave open.39
8 Conclusion
This paper has explored the consequences of the discovery that there are logophoric
pronouns that can be interpreted de re. We gave an analysis of the logophoric
pronoun in Ewe that maintains the orthodox assumption that it is bound by an
attitude predicate, thereby accounting for its distribution. The innovative aspect of
our proposal is the idea that a pronoun in this configuration can be interpreted de re
provided that it is embedded in a resP, enabling it to interact with a concept
generator. This move necessitated a modification of the definition of concept
generators that has the conceptual advantage of making it unnecessary to posit
constraints on the distribution of resPs in the embedded clause in order to prevent
concept generator variables from interacting with de se bound pronouns. On the
empirical side, the theoretical apparatus made available by this proposal provides an
account of observations due to Heim and Sharvit concerning binding-theoretic
effects with de re anaphors and pronouns. In light of these considerations, it seems
that the surprising fact is not that logophors can be interpreted de re, but rather that
other elements such as PRO cannot be. We have offered a suggestion concerning
why this should be that we hope will be explored in future work, particularly in
relation to other obligatorily de se elements such as predicates of personal taste and
epistemic modals, and to logophors in languages other than Ewe.
We close by considering whether our data might motivate a more radical
departure from traditional analyses of attitude reports than we have proposed in this
paper. Here we have been quite conservative, in that we have relied heavily on the
view that de se construals arise via binding by an attitude verb, where such
predicates are analyzed as quantifiers over world-individual pairs. Yet this view is in
part motivated precisely by the observation that natural language has expressions
that are obligatorily interpreted de se. Don’t our data challenge this idea?
The data certainly do not falsify the claim that there are obligatorily de se
expressions in natural language: generalizations concerning PRO, predicates of
personal taste and epistemic modals remain robust, while the possibility that
logophors in languages other than Ewe are necessarily de se remains open, pending
further research. Adopting a more radical approach to the analysis of yè would entail
either (a) abandoning the binding-by-attitude-verbs approach to de se entirely, or (b)
formulating a new mechanism to derive the Ewe data that can sit along the binding-
by-attitude-verbs approach. The first move would mean giving up the considerable
progress that has been made in understanding de se in a variety of empirical
domains by modeling de se pronouns as variables bound by attitude verbs. The
39 One of the challenges in this area is to account for the fact that these Principle B violations do not arise
with first person pronouns (Arregui 2007). In (i), the subject pronoun can be read de se and the object
de re:
(i) I dreamt that I was Brigitte Bardot and I kissed me. (Lakoff 1970)
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second would complicate the theoretical apparatus in a manner that seems
unnecessary, given that we have shown that the data can be accommodated within
an existing framework for de se and de re attitude reports by means of a minimal
amendment of the concept generator approach to de re.
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